Reorganization.

 * fixingAttMIME, rhbzpage, xorgBugCategories moved to data/rhlib
   directory,
 * docs directory removed ... keep documentation in JSDocs; rewrite in MD
   is a waste of time.
 * move Ehsan’s scripts to separate data/tweaks directory.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 82 deletions

diff --git a/docs/xhr.md b/docs/xhr.md
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-The `xhr` module provides access to `XMLHttpRequest`
-functionality, also known as AJAX.
-
-## Exports ##
-
-<code>xhr.**XMLHttpRequest**()</code>
-
-Creates an `XMLHttpRequest`. This is a constructor, so its use
-should always be preceded by the `new` operator. For more information,
-see the MDC page on [Using XMLHttpRequest].
-
-<code>xhr.**getRequestCount**()</code>
-
-Returns the number of `XMLHttpRequest` objects that are alive
-(i.e., currently active or about to be).
-
-## Limitations ##
-
-The `XMLHttpRequest` object is currently fairly limited, and does not
-yet implement the `addEventListener()` or `removeEventListener()`
-methods. It also doesn't yet implement the `upload` property.
-
-Furthermore, the `XMLHttpRequest` object does not currently support
-the `mozBackgroundRequest` property. All security UI, such as
-username/password prompts, are automatically suppressed, so if
-required authentication information isn't passed to the `open()`
-method, the request will fail.
-
-## Resource Use ##
-
-Whenever this module is unloaded, all in-progress requests are immediately
-aborted.
-
-## Security Concerns ##
-
-By default, the `XMLHttpRequest` object grants full access to any
-protocol scheme, which means that it can be used to read from (but not
-write to) the host system's entire filesystem. It also has unfettered
-access to any local area networks, VPNs, and the internet.
-
-### Threat Model ###
-
-The `XMLHttpRequest` object can be used by an extension to "phone
-home" and transmit potentially sensitive user data to third
-parties.
-
-If access to the filesystem isn't prevented, it could easily be used
-to access sensitive user data, though this may be inconsequential if
-the client can't access the network.
-
-If access to local area networks isn't prevented, malicious Jetpack
-code could access sensitive data.
-
-If transmission of cookies isn't prevented, malicious Jetpack code
-could access sensitive data.
-
-Attenuating access based on a regular expression may be ineffective if
-it's easy to write a regular expression that *looks* safe but contains
-a special character or two that makes it far less secure than it seems
-at first glance.
-
-### Possible Attenuations ###
-
-<span class="aside">
-We may also want to consider attenuating further based on domain name
-and possibly even restricting the protocol to `https:` only, to reduce
-risk.
-</span>
-
-Before being exposed to unprivileged Jetpack code, this object needs
-to be attenuated in such a way that, at the very least, it can't
-access the user's filesystem. This can probably be done most securely
-by white-listing the protocols that can be used in the URL passed to
-the `open()` method, and limiting them to `http:`, `https:`, and
-possibly a special scheme that can be used to access the Jetpack
-extension's packaged, read-only resources.
-
-Finally, we need to also consider attenuating http/https requests such
-that they're "sandboxed" and don't communicate potentially sensitive
-cookie information.
-
-  [Using XMLHttpRequest]: https://developer.mozilla.org/En/Using_XMLHttpRequest